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In appellateadjudicatbn,&Cis10118
are rendered by a rnulthxmber court
as a collectiveentity, mt by individual
judgesmy&
legal scholars have only
just bepun to explore the f o d
and i n f o d promaws by which
individualvmtes are tramdonnedinto
a eo11ectivejudgment Inp
e p
they have paid insufEclentattention
to the ways in which the vote of each
individualjudge is influend by
the v i m of her colleagueson a
multimembercourt.
In recent years, a growing number of
political scientists &loring judicial
behavior have modeled th& aspect of
adjudication. Some theorists have
recognized, as Lee Epstein and Jack Knight
write in The Choicesjustices Muke (1998),
that judges "are strategic actors who realize
that their ability to achieve their goals
de~endson a consideration of the
preferences of others, of the choices they
expect others to make, and of the
~titutionalcontext in which they act."
In certain contexts, a rational judge will
deviate from her personal sincere -views
about the law in brder to secure the,most
desirable collective decision possible, -given
the views held by the other rel-t
participants (judges or other governmental
actors) who share input into that M
collective decision.
This political science scholarship is
either empirical or predictive, identifjmg
when strategic behavior does or is likely to
occur. It tells us n o h g about how judges
ought to operate. Thls normative question is
my focus here: Under what circumstances,
and for what ends,may a judge appropriately
engage in strategic behavior as a member of
and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember a multimember court? Not infrequently as
Courts"and is reprinted with permission kwis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager have
from Michqpn Law Review,Augwt 1999, noted ("The One and the Many:
Vol. 97, no. 8. Copyright 1999 by The Adjudcation in Collegd Courts," 81
Michigan law Review Association. Thefull Califomiu Law Review 1 [1993]),a judge
article, with citations, is availabZefrum will &cover that by supporting an
Law Quadrangle Notes or the author outcome or rationale with which she
dmgrees, she can prevent her courtS
adoption of some other outcome or
rationale that she thinks worse either for
justice in the case before her or for the state
of the law in general. When such
A

on multimember courts

-

-

C

The more capacious or
multivariate a justice's
jurisprudential methodology.
the more facts will become
relevant to her comparison
and ranking of alternative
legal rules.

arise, must a judge always
vote for iules that reflect her best personal
judgment as to how a legal issue ought to
be addressed without considering how her
input will alfect the Court's collective
output? Or may the judge vole to secure
what she deems the best possible collective
resolution of the case, even if LO do so she
must strategically suppress or misrepresent
her sincere personal views?
Throughout this article, I shall use the
term "smcere voting" to refer to the vote
that represents an individual judge's topranked or ideal judgment as to what
constitutes the best response to resolve a
discrete legal controversy, without
c~nsideringthe impact of his vote on the
s
or
substantive collective result in h ~ court
in other institutions. In other words, a
judge votes sincerely if he supports the
position that he honestly thinks should win
arid that he would endorse were he alone
on the court. I shall use the term "strategc
voting" to refer to a judge's decision to vote
for a position that does not truly reflect his
"sincere"judgment in order to secure the
best feasible outcome gven the influence of
his colleagues in the decisionmalang
process. To make this inquiry more
manageable, I confine my focus to strategc
behavior in merit determinations by justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court.

Strategic decisionmaking
At the outset, let me identify this
project's central premlse concerning judlcial
motivation Subject to resource constraints,
judges endeavor to d~scernand rendei the~r
best judgment as to the proper resolution of
cases accord~ngto their best conception of
the law By this assumption I intend to
distlngulsh my analyt~calapproach from
lhat employed by much recent l~terature
concerning judlaal behamor, whlch posits
thal judges employ instrun~entalrational~ty
LO advance one or more personal agendas
(such as a desire to imbue the substantwe
content of the law w t h then personal
policy preferences, to enhance thelr
professional reputation and personal
prestige, and to cnhance leisure)

The strategc pursuit of legtimate
adjudicatoiy values falls into two categories:
strategc voting to improve the institutional
efficacy of the Court's collective product
s
corm ("form-driven"
through ~ t quantitative
strateges); and strategc voting to improve
the substantive content of the Court's
collective product ("content-driven"
strategies). Before delving into the details,
however, let me introduce an analytic
approach that is relevant for assessing the
attractiveness of strategc voting across a
range of circumstances.

A. Assessing the magnitude of

perceived error (MPE) of the
Court's OlltpUt.
On a multimember court, sincere voting
by a justice d l often lead to a collective
outcome that she believes is wrong. She
might, through strategc voting, be able to
improve the collective outcome from a
position she considers wrong to one she
considers less wrong. To decide whether it
is worth seizing h s opportunity she must
first consider how important it is for her to
supplant che greater error with the lesser one.
To make this assessment, she must
determine not only her sincere order of
preference for various rules (R1 through
Rn);she must also establish the relative
degree of error in adopting each suboptimal
rule. This latter determination I shall call
the "ma,@tude of perceived error" (MPE).
The following factors, anlong others, may
be relevant to this calculation:
Error costs. What principles are at
stake in the choice between two rules?
What tangible benefits or burdens are being
allocated?A justice might care more about
articulating the best rule when it svill
determine issues of personal liberty, say
guiltlinnocence or imprisonment/esecution,
than when the ~ u l ewill determine issues of
financial consequence, say availability of
punitive damages, or amoral policy
concerns, say a procedural pleading
requirement.
Error size. What is the size of a rule's
perceived error? If the legal issue involves
personal liberty, how much will be wrongly
granted or denied? If the legal issue involves
money, h o ~ 7m~lchwill be wrongly allocated?

Error rigidity. Can those governed by
the rule circumvent its erroneous
application? A justice might care more
about correctness with rules that impose
immutable requirements on private conduct
than with those that merely establish
default rules around whch private parties
can maneuver.
Error duration. How much precedential
sipficance will the legal rule have? The
more frequently the same or substantially
equivalent issues will arise in the future, the
greater the temporal "ripple effect" created
by the Instant Case, and thus the more
important it is to be correct today
Error certitude. How confident is the
justice in her ranlungs based on the
aforementioned variables? The more certain
she is about R1,the more she will perceive
any error as significant.
An MPE assessment of t h s sort, in one
form or another, determines a justice's
incentive to engage in form-driven and
content-driven strategic voting. Of course,
the particular factors (and weights there00
included in a justice's MPE assessment are
derived from her jurisprudential paradigm,
and, more specially, the judgment criteria
that guide her legal interpretations. The
more capacious or multivariate a justice's
jurisprudential methodology, the more facts
will become relevant to her comparison and
ranlung of alternative legal rules.

B. Strategic voting to improve the
form of collective decisions.
The form of a multinlember court's
product refers to the size of the justice's
agreement (e.g., unanimous, majority
plurality, or singular). Specific coalition
sizes can promote various institutional
values, and occasionally a justice's desire to
shape a particular coalition d l incline her
to endorse an outcome she views as
substantatively suboptimal. She might vote
insincerely with respect to substance to
forge a majority coahtion supporting a
disposition of the case, she might do so to
forge a majority coalition supporting an
opinion articulating a specific legal rule,
and she might do so to forge a supermajority
coalition such as a unanimous opinion.

1. Formation of maj ority-disposition
coalitions.
If the Instant Case presents three or
more plausible dispositions, sincere voting
might mean that no majority agrees on a
single preferred disposition (for example,
the justices might split among affirm,
reverse, and remand). Under the Court's
prevailing aggregation rules, such a division
prevents the Court from deciding the case.
The Court could avoid the potential
impasse through various voting protocols,
including: (a) adopt the disposition with
largest plurality support (if any); (b) hold a
"run-off' vote between the top two votegetting dispositions; or (c) compare
dispositions two at a time, and select the
option that defeats all other alternatives in
head-to-head competition if one emerges.
The Court has eschewed these
structured routes. Rather, individual justices
"play chicken" until one faction gves in and
shifts to its second-ranked rather than topranked dsposition. In the final set of
opinions issued, each of the factions (which
might include from one to four justices)
articulates its sincere position. But one of
the minority factions then explains that, in
order to construct a majority-disposition
coalition necessary- to decide the case, the
faction members will join another faction
by voting for what they consider to be the
second-best disposition.
A justice's willingness to switch from his
sincere to second-best disposition should
depend on both institutional and
substantive variables. First, how much
value does he place on constructing a
majority-disposition coalition such that the
Court can issue a judgment in the Instant
Case? Second, based on the magnitude of
perceived error assessment, how strong is
his preference for his top-ranked
disposition (Dl) over his second (Dl), and
his second-ranked over the third (D3)?
It is difficult to determine just how
frequently sincere voting generates such
three-disposition impasses. The practice of
resolving them does suggest, however,
general acceptance of an adjudicative norm
that sincere views about case disposition
may be sacrified in order to facilitate the
Court's case-deciding function.
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2. Formation of majority-opinion
coalitions.

Perhaps much more frequently, a
majority of the Court will agree on a single
disposition but disagree as to the optimal
legal rule justifying that disposition. Sincere
voting will leave the majority disposition
supported by two or more divergent rules,
each championed by a minority faction of
one to four justices. Such fractured support
for the Court's disposition undermines
various institutional values.
First, a fractured decision undermines
the clarity of the legal rules that will govern
future disputes, thereby increasing the
unpredictability of the law's application to
primary conduct and increasing the costs of
future decisionmalung by subsequent
courts confronting the same legal issues.
Second, it undermines the durability of
legal rules, both by weakening the
precedential value of the Instant Case, and
perhaps also by diminishing public respect
for judicial decisions generally Third, it
undermines the expressive function of
adjudication, by failing to articulate a
singular, coherent justification for the
judicial decisions.
In response to these institutional
concerns, one or more justices often
deviates from her substantively preferred
mle in order to accommodate her
colleagues sufficiently to form a majorityopinion coalition. Sometimes, the voteshifting faction's opinion candidly reveals
the decision to vote strategcally More
frequently, the vote-shifting faction
suppresses its sincere views in the
published opinions, and the strategc
behavior can be detected, if at all, only
through careful research of what occurred
behind the scenes. For example, as Epstein
and Kn~ghtnote in The ChoicesJtlstices
Make, Justice Powell voted insincerely in
Nixon v. Fitqerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982) in
order to forge a majority coalition; they
quote Powell: "[Ilt is evident that a Court
opinion is not assured if each of us remains
with our first preference votes . . . . As I
view the Nixon cases as uniquely requiring
a Court opinion, I am now prepared to

defer to [he wishes of you [Chief Justice
Burger], Bill Rehnquist, and Sandra"
[Sandra Day O'Connor] in order to lorge a
single opinion of the Court.
It is frequently assumed that, in making
these calculations, the majority will
converge in a moderate or median position.
This may well be quite likely when the
justices' ideal points can be lined up nicely
in a single-peaked fashion along a single
dimension, for instance, from liberal to
conservative. Convergence on a center
position along the spectrum is not
guaranteed, however, depending on the
effects of small-group dynamics.
And sometimes the options under
discussion cannot easily be aligned along a
single dimension. Thus convergence in
form does not theoretically imply
movement toward a schematically median
or substantively moderate position.
3. Formation of supermajority coalitions.
More mfrequently, justices coordinate
their voting to produce a unanimous
opinion. Unanimity establishes a very
durable judicial precedent, and it may elicit
greater respect from nonjudicial actors,
both ensuring short-term compliance with
the Instant Case disposition and ensuring
long-term respect for the decision's
underlying principles. More specifically,
coordinated unanimity appears to be
strategcally deployed to counter perceptible
threats to the Court's legal (and sometimes
moral) authority
Even where unanimity is not attainable,
justices might also feel some impulse to add
another voice to an existing majority
coalition. Such "extra" joinders may add to
a precedent's durability, which a justice
might value even at h e cost of a sincere vole.
For each of the types of coalitions
described in this section, a justice would
weigh the institutional values to be gained
against the cosu of insincerity in the
particular case, which may include
instilutional costs as well. Form-driven
strategic voting appears to be a generally
accepted practice on the Court. It is difficult
for outsiders to identify each occurrence,
however; justices understandably do not
candidly announce their decisions to form

insincere coalitions when doing so would
undermine their slrategic purpose of
projecting solidarity

C. Strategic voting to improve the
content of legal rules.
Due to conventional voting protocols,
appellate courts offer individual judges
fewer opportunities to engage in contentdri-ven strategic voting than are available to
members of many other collegial bodies.
For example, legislatures often decide issues
through a series of votes comparing two
options at a time, sometimes called a
motion-and-amendment process, such that
savvy, sophisticated voting on early choices
frequently can manipulate the ultimate path
of alternative pairings and hence the
substantive outcome. On the Supreme
Court, each justice typically registers a
single vote to dispose of the entire case,
rather than a vote resolving each issue
raised by the case. Thus multiple-issue
cases do not generally present a justice with
an opportunity to misrepresent her views
on one or more issues just to dictate the
preferred resolution of the case as a wlzole.
This said, a justice may still have the
opportunity to guide the Court's collective
output toward her sincere view through
various forms of strategic voting behavior. I
wli focus primarily on two such scenarios,
one unilateral and one bilateral.
1. Unilateral strategic voting to influence
a discrete legal rule.

Sometimes a justice, by supporting a
legal rule with which she disagrees, can
unilaterally prevent a collective outcome
that she considers even worse. Such a
unilateral strategy might be attractive in
either of two circumstances, both of which
can helpfully be illustra~edby locusing on
Justice Brennan's behavior in Craig lJ.Boren
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Under an intentionally simplified version
of the case, the relevant legal issue was
ulhether discrimination on the basis of sex
should be subject to strict scrutiny (SS),
intermediate scrutiny (IS), or rational basis
scmtiny (RBS), Suppose the justices' firstrank judgments divided them into three
equal-sized factions as follows:Justice

Brennank faction preferred SS; Justice
Powell's faction preferred IS; and Justice
Rehnquistk faction preferred RBS. Justice
Brennank first-rank judgment can be
gleaned from the fact that he recently had
advocated SS in Frontier0 v. Richardson 41 1
U.S. 677 (1973), though he had failed to
convince a majority But in Craig, Brennan
circulated a draft opinion for the Court that
advocated intermediate scrutiny, a view that
ultimately won the day
Brennan apparently concluded that it
was preferable to vote strategically to
establish a durable precedent now for IS,
rather than to vote sincerely for SS. There
are two different scenarios under whch
such a strategic maneuver makes sense. The
first ("Craig I") involves an effort to
influence the precedential sipficance of
the decision, assuming that all other justices
remain steadfast; and the second ("Craig 11")
involves an effort to influence the collective
outcome by encouraging another justice to
change her vote.
First, Brennan might have assumed that
the Court would remain fractured across
the three tests as described above, and that
Powell and his faction would join the
Brennan faction in invalidating the sexbased classification. If so, Powell's IS test
would have established a precedent of sorts
under the narrowest-grounds rule. But
Brennan might plausibly have feared that an
increasingly conservative Court would
embrace RBS in a future case, bmshng the
weak Craig precedent for IS aside. Brennan
could then try to pretennit this most
disfavored possibility by strengthening the
Craig precedent, through joining Powell's
position to forge a majority-opinion
coalition invalidating the statute under
intermediate scrutiny This Craig I scenario
illustrates Brennank ability to forestall a
highly disfavored outcome (a majoritybacked precedent for RBS in a future case)
by influencing the precedential significance
of he Instant Case.
The Craig I1 scenario involves an effort
by a strategic-minded justice to induce a
colleague to change her articulated position,
thus changing the collective outcome in a
favorable direction. Such an opportunity
may arise whenever the colleague's

preference is multidimensional, meaning
there are two or more variables chat drive
her ranking of rules. In such circumstances
a justice sometimes can, by strategcally
repositioning lzirnself, create or destroy
multidimensional options and thus
influence the colleague's selection from
among the available options.
For example, suppose Justice Powell and
his faction are concerned with both the
substance and form of the collective
decision in Craig. Powell favors IS, but he
also favors construction of a majorityopinion coalition to secure the concomitant
institutional benefits. Supose further that
Powell's form-driven preference dominates,
such that he prefers to forge a majority
opinion even at the cost of abandoning IS.
If Powell prefers RBS to SS, then he would
be inclined to join the Rehnquist faction at
RBS LO secure the institutional values of a
majority-opinion coalition. Brennan could
rationally tiy to forestall this most
disfavored possibility by embracing IS
rather than SS. This strategic maneuver
would induce Powell to stay with IS rather
than shift to RBS, by enabling Powell to
secure both h s preferred substance (IS) and
form (joining Brennan in a majorityopinion coaliton). This Craig I1 scenario
illustrates Brennank ability to avert a highly
disfavored outcome (a majority-backed
precedent for RBS in the Instant Case) by
influencing a colleague's vote in this case.
In both scenarios illustrated through
Craig I and 11,Justice Brennan could
rationally conclude that the project of best
implementing the law according to his
intrinsic and relational jud,ment criteria
dictated a strategic choice to eschew his
sincere position SS and enshrine his
second-ranked rule IS now, thereby averting
the present or future possibility of hls thudranked RBS. This archetypal scenario of
unilateral strategic belzavlor can be modeled
as follows, applying the " m a p t u d e of
perceived error" (MPE) concept developed
earlier. According to Justice Brennan's
intrinsic and relational jud,pent criteria,
his ranking of the three rules proposed in

Craig is as follows: R1 = SS, RZ = IS, and

R3 = RBS.When deciding whether to vote
strategcally, Brennan should consider both
the likelihood of the Court ultimately
settling on each option and the MPE
represented by the two suboptimal rules,
R2 and R3.With respect to the former
variable, the more confident Brennan is that
unless he forges a majority opinion
coalition for IS in the Instant Case a
majority will embrace RBS in a near future
case (Craig I) or even the Instant Case
(Craig II), the more willing he should be to
vote strategcally With respect to the latter
variable, the more he views RZ as a minor
error and R3 as a major one, the more
willing he should be to vote strategically
and create a minor error in order to prevent
a serious one.
Unilateral strategic maneuvering of these
types is likely a common occurrence, even
though it typically cannot be detected by
others. Justices quxe frequently change
their views over the course of a decision. Of
course, this sometimes reflects a change in
sincere views. Sometimes this behavior is
driven by the institutional benefits of a
majority opinion coalition, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that this is not the
primary motivation. Most of the time, I
think justices care about forgng a majority
coalition only if it settles on a rule they
support - at least support enough. If
asked whether they would prefer a
majority-opinion coalition to coalesce even
if they would be left in dissent or
concurrence, I'd bet most often they would
say no. If my surmise is correct, then much
of the documented position jockeying and
concession granting on the Supreme Court
reflects sti-ategc behavior designed to
improve the content of legal mles.
2. Bilateral vote trading.
Justices will sometimes confront an
opportunity to trade votes with one
another; each of two justices votes for the
other's sincere view on one issue in
exchange for the other's support of his
sincere view on another. Such an agreement
can he either ex~licitor tacit.
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a. Explicit vote trades. Consider the
following "vote-trading exemplar"
illustrating explicit ~7otetrading across two
separate cases. Suppose the Court's docket
contains two separate cases, Case Search
raising the question whether a particular
search violates the Fourth Amendment, and
Case Cruel raising the question whether a
particular mode of execution violates the
Eighth Amendment. The tentative
conference vote in Case Search is 5-4for
the criminal defendant, with Justice Wapner
in the majority and Justice Judy in the
dissent. The tentative conference vote in
Case Cruel is 5-4 for the state, with Justice
Judy in the majority and Justice Wapner in
the dissent. Suppose Wapner is close to
indifferent about his apparent victory in
Case Search, but is very troubled by his
apparent loss in Case Cruel; conversely,
suppose Judy is close to indifferent about
her apparent victory in case Cruel, but is
very troubled by her apparent loss m Case
Search. Wapner and Judy then agree to
trade votes across the two cases; Wapner
switches to vote for the state in Case Search,
and Judy switches to vote for the crimnal
defendant in Case Cruel. From the
perspective of each justice, the trade has
improved the overall state of the law; each
views the trade as creating what he or she
considers a minor error but corrects what
he or she considers a more major error.
Justice Wapner is willing to sacrifice h s
feasible victory in Case Cruel (the
"sacrificed case") for a more meaningful
victory in Case Search (the "acquired case");
for Justice Judy, the "sacrificed"and
"acquired" cases are reversed.
It is very difficult to identify clear
examples of explicit vote trading. My own
sense, in accord with that of other scholars,
is that explicit vote trading rarely - and
perhaps never - takes place.
b. Tacit vote trades. On the other hand,
my sense (again in accord with others) is
that a form of implicit and informal vote
trading is common. Sometimes, a justice let's use the fictional Judge Wapner quickly joins a draft opinion circulated by a
colleague even through the doctrinal rule
articulated does not reflect his sincere

position. Wapner nevertheless joins quickly
and without criticism, indeed perhaps with
praise - because (a) he thinks the error is
relatively minor, and (b) he wants to
encourage the author to sign onto an
opinion in a completely separate but more
significant case that Wapner has recently
circulated or will circulate soon.
Of course, such tacit back-scratching
"agreements" are not formally enforceable.
The social norms of cooperation and
congeniality prevailing on the Court,
however, might strongly encourage a
practice of presumptive reciprocity Thus,
while explicit vote trading seems to be
shunned in word and deed, a softer form of
tacit trading may well be commonplace.

Normative constraints
on strategic voting
Form-driven strategc voting appears
relatively uncontroversial; content-driven
strategc voting engenders much greater
controversy Explicit vote trading is
frequently denounced, though generally
without clear explanation. The more
common but subtle forms of tacit vote
trading and Craig-like unilateral
maneuvering either are ignored or provoke
lukewarm concerns. My strong sense is that
there is considerable disagreement about
the proper line between acceptable and
unacceptable sti-ategc behavior and the
reason for drawing it.

Litigant-focused constraints
A. Sacrosanct disposition objections.
The primary function of even appellate
adjudication is commonly said to be
resolving a concrete legal dispute between
two or more litigants, with the articulation
of legal principles being incidental to that
task. Even assuming as I do here that
justices identify governing legal rules first
and derive dispositions from them, one
might believe that once the proper
resolution of the dispute is identified, the
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to that resolution.

Thrs vim d e r l i e s what I call the
amsanct dLspositim constraint on
strategic behavior: a justice may vote
strategically for a suboptimal rule only if
her insincere vote leads to the same
disposition as her sincere vote would have
done. kgal rules are fair fodder for strategic
play. but sincerely derived case d~positions
are sacrosant.
Depending on whether one believes this
sacrosanct dLsposition principle should be
unyielding or merely presumptive, a sincere
disposition might impose either a "hardnor
a "soft" constraint on rule-focused
strategmng.
Many people, were they a litigant in
Case Search or Cruel, would be quite
hturbed if they would have won had a
justice voted sincerely. but lost because the
justice voted strategically to improve the
collective legal rule.
The strength of this underlying intuition,
however, can be questioned on its own ' '
terms. To begm with, theintuition
confronts an interesting temporal question.
By hypothesis, strategically improving the
legal rule today affects not only who wins
the Instant Case but also who dwin
future cases,changmg future winners
(under the sincere rule) to future losers and
vice versa. Why should the entitlement of
today's would-be winner under sincere
voting trump the entitlement of the future's
would-be winner under the strategically
secured improved rule3
Moreover, the intuition seemmgly
presumes that litigants care more about
winning than about establishing favorable
legal rules. lhs is not always so. Some
,
litigants expect to be repeat players in
slrnilar future cases, and they may be
d h n g to sacrifice a particular victory for a
more favorable legal rule over the long run.
Some litigants who do not expect repeat
phy may nevertheless care more about
estabhhg favorable legal principles than
about winning the discrete dupute, either
bemuse they are representing others in c k
litigation or because they care about the
"pressive content of the law

'

The intuition seemingly
presumes that litigants care
more about winning than
about establishing favorable
legal rules. This is not always
so. Some litigants expect to be
repeat players in similar future
1 cases, and they may be willing
1
1 to sacrifice a particular victory
1 for a more favorable legal rule
over the long run.

1

If persuasive on its own tenns, the
disposition constraint would preclude some
other common adjudicatory practices
besides vote trading. First, the constraint
contravenes some well-accepted norms
governing solo decisionmaking that lead
justices to support locally suboptimal
decisions. Even if Justice Solo's intrinsic
judgment criteria incline her to prefer rule
R1 leading to disposition Dl,she might
strategically endorse RZ and D2 either to
embrace stare clecisis and maintain
consistency with, or, alternatively, to
compensate for, a prior case that she views
as wrongly decided. Or, she might decide
the Instant Case suboptimally to establish
the best long-term precedent for a series of
cases. Taken seriously, the disposition
constraint would appear to rule out each of
these well-accepted adjudicator- practices.
Second, the disposition constraint also
rests in tension with some more
controversial norms governing solo
decisionmalang. As earlier discussed,
Alexander Bickers "passive virtues"
sometimes lead justices to deny favorable
judgments to would-be winners; concerns
about public resistance sometimes lead
justices to deny immediate remediation to
victorious litigants; concerns about
congressional overruling might lead justices
to shy away from sincere rules in a manner
depriving a would-be winner of a favorable
judgment.
Third, the disposition constraint would
appear to rule out form-driven maneuvers
in certain contexts. When a justice
strategically forms a majority-disposition
coalition to avold a three-disposition
impasse, by definition she votes for a
disposition other than her sincere choice.
With respect to strategc voting designed to
forge a majority-opinion coalition,
sometimes one or more justices might
diverge from their sincere disposition in
order to do so. The disposition constraint
would rule out such form-driven
maneuvers.
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B. The litigant participation objection.
This objection starts with the premise
that adjudication is primarily party-driven,
in the sense that the judicial decision is
designed to respond to the factual proofs
and reasoned arguments advanced by
adversarial parties. Concomitantly, the
integnty of adjudication also entails a
reasoned decisionmaker, one who will
respond to and fairly evaluate the reasoned
arguments of the parties.
Explicit or tacit vote trading partially
undermines the meaningfulness of party
participation in the Instant Case by
introducing an influential element - the
Other Case - that cannot readily be
identified in advance. Parties cannot fairly
be expected to anticipate, let alone brief, the
entire set of other cases that might end up
influencing the decision in the Instant Case
through a vote trade; that set consists of
every other case on the Court's docket.
As a result, decisions influenced by vote
trading are arbitrary from the litigants'
perspective in the sense that they cannot
participate meaningfully, through reasoned
argument, in the critical judicial
determination - the trading justices'
comparative evaluation of error maptudes.
Whether this objection is powerful
enough to explain the consensus antipathy
toward vote trading, however, turns on the
significance one attaches to meaningful
party participation through the presentation
of reasoned arguments. The more central
one views this role on either instrumental
or intrinsic grounds, the more troubling
vote trading becomes. But the more one
believes that party-driven adjudication,
while perhaps a good idea, is not
normatively essential, then the less
troubling vote trading becomes. At the far
extreme, if one views parties as helpful but
non-crucial judicial assistants, then the
justices' resort to decisionmaking means
beyond the parties' ken is not that
disturbing at all. Recall that even vote
trading does not devalue or ignore litigant
participation entirely; it just values some
non-participatory aspects of reasoning
as well.
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Reasoned justification
constraints
This section explores a series of related
objections as applied, at least initially, to
bilateral trading. Each objection reflects a
theme common to many jurisprudential
paradigms: when justices declare whai the
law is en route to deciding cases, we expect
them to base that declaration on reasoned
argument of a certain form.

A. Adjudication as a justificatory
practice.
Many respectable jurisprudential
paradigms hold that adjudication is, first
and foremost, a justificatory practice.
According to this view, the legtimacy of
courts' authority turns on the fact that
adjudication is a form of justification or
reason gving, in a way that other forms of
decisionmaking are not. If a judge does not
have a reasoned justification for a legal
decision, she has no legtimate claim to the
exercise of coercive authority over the
litigants. As a result, we are rightly hostile
to any adjudicatory practlce that
undermines the process and integnty of
justification, even if that practice in some
sense "improves" the doctrinal rules
ultimately produced. Process, not result,
is paramount.
With this process focus in mind, one
might challenge explicit and tacit vote
trading as depriving the two traded
dec~sionsof the type of reasoned
justification necessary to judicial legtimacy.
After all, there seems to be an element of
arbitrariness to the decisionmaking in both
involved cases. In the vote-trading
exemplar, for example, Justices Wapner and
Judy do not take each of Cases Search and
Cruel into account when deciding the other
one because the result in one case
influences their sincere ranking of the
available rules in the other. Rather, they
take the other case into account only
because of the happenstance that, given the
particular lineup of all nine justices in both
cases, there is an available trade that both
believe improves the set of results. If Justice
Wapner were asked why he voted the way

he did in Case Search, he could not provide
a complete answer without mentioning the
role played by Case Cruel. While this
reference would partially "explain" his
decision, on the surface it would hardly
seem to "ustify" it, at least in any sense
familiar to the judicial enterprise.
But reliance on familiarity here is
dangerous, precisely because multimember
decisonmalng may enable novel but still
legtimate notions of justification. Viewed in
isolation, Wapner's decision in Case Search
seems unprincipled; he has seemingly
"sacrificed" this case for law improvement
elsewhere. But why view Case Search in
isolation? The mere possibility of bilateral
vote trading essentially allows a justice to
vote on two issues at once as a packaged
deal, an option generally unavailable to
judges sitting alone. Consider Justice
Wapner's approach to the vote-trading
exemplar. Wapner sincerely supports Rule
S+ over Rule S- in Case Search and Rule C+
over Rule C- in Case Cruel, but if everyone
votes sincerely the Court will endorse Rule
S- in Case Search and Rule C- in Case
Cruel. Wapner can trade across the two
cases with Justice Judy, meaning he can
control whether the Court produces rules
S+ and C- (by voting sincerely) or rules Sand C+ (by trading). Put differently, Wapner
can change the relevant "choice set" from a
choice among single rules to a choice
among rule combinations.
As illustrated earlier, Wapner can
employ the "magnitude of perceived error"
rubric to reason from his jurisprudential
premises to the conclusion that he prefers
package S- and C+ to package S+ and C-.
His MPE assessment leads him to view
collective outcome S- as a lesser error than
collective outcome C-; he is therefore
willing to endure the former to forestall the
latter. He is not merely appraising the two
combinations to see which he prefers in
some troubling result-oriented sense.
Rather, he is employing the very same
process of reasoning that led him to prefer
S+ over S- and C+ over C- in the first
instance.

To be sure, the comparison of rule
packages rather than individual rules is
unfamilar. But why would this reasoning
process, deemed legtimate when used to
favor one rule over another, suddenly
become illegtimate when used to prefer
one rule package over another? It cannot be
problematic just because Wapner finds
neither package ideal. T h complaint
would have too far-reachng consequences,
as judges frequently must choose between
two or more imperfect options when the
optimal option is not feasible to secure. And
it cannot be problematic just because there
is a sense in which, in evaluating the MPEs
associated with S- and C-, Wapner might be
comparing "apples and oranges" if the two
issues draw upon very different underlying
principles. First, it is unclear whether such
an apples-and-oranges comparison should
be troubhg from a theoretical standpoint.
But in any event, this complaint would also
have too far-reachng consequences, as
judges frequently must compare
fundamentally different principles in
ranlung alternatives.
Let us return to the initial claim here,
that concern for cabining illegtimate
assertions of coercive judicial authority
dictates hostility toward any adjudicatory
practice that undermines the process and
integrity of justification, even if that practice
in some sense "improves" the doctrinal rule
ultimately produced. It is true that vote
trading is generally described in terms of
improved results, not proper process. But a
justice can provide the same type of
justificatory explanation for a trade as for a
single-issue ranking: the outcome chosen
best satisfied his intrinsic and relational
criteria talung relevant MPEs into account.
The only difference is that the justice in a
vote-trading scenario ranks combinations of
rules rather than single rules. This
distinction does not appear to make the
ranking process any less an exercise in
reasoned justification.

One might nonetheless argue that the
different ways of conceiving the choice set
matters with respect to adjudicatory norms
relating to explanation rather than
justification. The next tu7o sections consider
other norms arguably undermined by vote
trading: candor and noncornrnodificaton of
judgments.

B. The candor objection.
Explicit and tacit vote trading would
appear to lead a justice to endorse openly a
justification different from her true
motivation - the MPE calculation. Thus
decisionmalung through vote trading
violates an oft-proclaimed norm of judicial
candor.
This presumption of candor is frequently
justified on the ground that it disciplines
judicial reasoning. The act of reducing one's
true thought processes to written form
stimulates critical self-scrutiny and the act
of publication enables peers and the public
to evaluate and hold individual justices
accountable for their decisions. Vote tradmg
partly avoids these disciplining and
constraining effects of transparency, because
the dnving force behind a justice's decision
to trade - h s comparative MPE assessment
of the two rules involved - is not revealed,
let alone publicly explained and justified.
These justifications for candor carry
some analytical and rhetorical force, though
their tangible effects are highly speculative.
This said, deciding just how much force to
gve to such an objection is difficult. If
embraced as a rigid constraint, the
obligation of transparency would call into
question a number of adjudicatory practices
besides vote trading. Some sophsticated
behaviors, including many of Alexander
Bickels "passive virtues," involve judicial
dissembling. Moreover, many
uncontroversial form-driven strategic
maneuvers designed to forge coalitions of
various sizes entail the suppression of
sincere views - indeed, that is the whole
point of forming unanimous-opinion
coalitions. Finally, content-driven strategc
maneuvers such as the unilateral Craig

In the vote-trading exemplar,justices
trade votes based on their reasoned (though
divergent) assessments of the rightness of
two reasoned (though divergent)
assessments of the rightness of two
collective outputs. The "currency" of
exchange is legal principle, not the traders'
own or the litigants' preferences or desires.
There is a sense in which two independent
products, the rule in the sacrificed case and
the rule in the acquired case, are appraised
for their relative value. But justices appraise
and compare the relative value of
competing rules or justificatory positions all
the time, without engendering a sense of
problematic commodification.
Concededly, social meaning
reformulation is not an on-off switch, and
commodification can range on a continuum
from complete to less-complete forms that
"Sear some indicia of commodification but
are more attenuated," as Margaret Radin
wrote in Contested Conzlnodities (1996).
Thus, even if one agrees that the votetrading exemplar is a far cry from a
prototypical market exchange, she might
still be somewhat troubled by indicia of
commodification still remaining. I think
that analytical argument cannot wholly
resolve the dispute.

Judiciallawmaking
constraints
The final set of objections revolves
around a common intuition: vote trading
crosses a conceptual or even constitutional
line dividing adjudication and legslation.
At one time thii intuition might have been
captured by the claim that courts "declare"
rather than "make" law, and that focus on
law-making is an ultra vires judicial
function. A more sophisticated and modem
version would propose that, m a
meaningful sense, courts do make law, but
do so in a peculiarly judicial manner.
Something about vote trading makes it
seem as though justices are making law in
an inappropriate manner, and therefore, the
practice transgresses the proper boundaries
of adjudication.

We generally associate vote trading with
legislative activity. Some people find judicial
vote trading intuitively illegtimate, I
believe, because they mentally associate the
practice w t h the more familiar
phenomenon of leplative logrolling. Based
on this connection, they wrongly assume
that the rationale for judicial vote trading
would mimic that for legslative vote
trading, and they (rightly) find the
preference-satisfaction rationale underlying
leplative logrolling anathema to judicial
reasoning. The first assumption is wrong
because judicial vote trading can be
supported by reference exclusively to legal
concepts and principles, and without
necessary resort to problematic objects such
as preference satisfaction.
Some might object that vote trading feels
legslative m nature because it seems to
focus on forward-lookmg law improvement
rather than backward-looking law
interpretation. "Law improvement" sounds
like a legslative task.
This way of characterizing the judicial
lawmalung constraint is rhetorically
powerful. However, it ignores the significant
extent to which well-accepted interpretive
practices already contain a forward-loolang,
improvement-oriented element. As
explained earlier, relational jud,ment
criteria require justices to look forward as
well as backward, to select a rule that is
optimal over a mn of related cases even if it
might be suboptimal for the Instant Case
viewed in isolation. The consistency
criterion, for example, requires justices to
envision the future cases in which today's
rule might apply and to fashion a rule today
that traces the optimal trajectory.
A third objection adds the following
premise: due to institutional distinctions
between courts and legislatures, the goal of
competency in lawmaking requires courts
to employ a different lawmalang
methodology than do legslatures.
Legslatures are comparatively well designed
to consider and study societal problems
comprehensively, and to devise optimal
forward-lo'3lcmgsolutions thereto. In
contrast, courts are not structured to be as
proficient at seeing far into the future, or at
perceiving and comprehensively

considering all of the ramifications and
interests affected by proposed doc~rinal
rules.
Given these observations, the argument
continues, we have much more confidence
in justices' ability to develop optimal
forward-loolzing rules when the justices
focus their attention on fashoning a direct
response to the facts and context of the
dispute before them, rather than when they
engage in a self-conscious project of
abstract law improvement.
While the premlse of this objection that courts should remain focused on
contextualized decisionmalung - is both
analytically and rhetorically powerful, the
deduction that vote trading violates this
norm demands greater scrutiny First, each
of the two cases'involved in a vote trade
satisfy the normal requirements for
concreteness and adverseness. The trading
justices (and the rest), therefore, start from
a fact-bound, contextual setting and can
reason outward when they construct their
initial ranhngs of, and assess their
magnitudes of perceived error for, the
proposed rules in each case.
One might characterize the next
reasoning step in the vote-trading process
- the comparison of MPEs in the two
cases - to be somewhat abstracted from
the case contests. When Justice Wapner
considers whether the perceived sacrifice in
Case Search is more than compensated by
the perceived improvement in Case Cruel,
he might ponder some seemingly abstract
questions like the following: Is it more
important for wrongful death sentences to
be avoided than for wrongful privacy
invasions to be allowed? This question
(and others like it) is not tethered to a
specific case. And yet, Justice Wapner
would certainly be aware of how his answer
to this question would ultinlately affect h s
vote and therefore the disposition of these
two concrete cases with identifiable parties.
In other svords, the case-specific
consequences of h s abstract reasoning
would be readily perceptible, at both
intellectual and visceral levels. This remains

a far cry from the sort of abstract legslative
rulemalung against which the judicial
practice is being measured.
Perhaps a slightly different concern
animates the comparative competence
objection. One might argue that the
acceptance of vote trading as a legtimate
practice will lead justices to shift the way
they approach adjudication in all contexts,
involving vote trading or not. The more
justices start thinlung about adjudication in
terms of optimal rulemalung, a mental
perspective facilitated by the constant
search for potential gains from trade, the
more they will become emboldened to
make less case-tethered and contextdisciplined decisions generally
This feared transformation is certainly
not fanciful; indeed, some might thnk
justices are already prone to the disease of
imagning themselves as unconstrained
lawmakers and thnlung about litigants as
inconvenient obstacles. But neither is the
transformation inevitable. Surely one can
imagne that, even as justices selfconsciously engage in vote trading, they
also remind themselves of the importance
of self-disciplined focus on case contexts,
facts, and parties. The question becomes
whether, as a prophylactic measure, a norm
against vote trading should be articulated
and internalized to forestall the risk of a
concomitant shift in the justice's selfunderstood job description. In my view, the
prophylactic seems unnecessary, but I
recognize this is a subjective and
speculativejudgment.

Conclusion
As Justice Brennan has noted, "The
Court is something of a paradox - it is at
once the whole and its constituent parts.
The very words 'the Court' mean
simultaneously the entity and its members."
Appreciation of this paradox is reflected in
an exciting explosion of political science
scholarship modeling judicial behavior,
scholarship that both predicts and tests for
various forms of strategc or sophisticated
conduct, and also offers new
conceptualizations of the relationship
between individual judges and their
multimember courts. In particular, there is
growing recognition that judicial behavior is
not shaped merely by ideologcal attitudes
and conceptions of legal reasoning, but also

by formal institutional structures and
informal role commitments. The question is
not whether judges act in strategic or
sophisticated ways, meaning whether they
consider the consequences of their choices
in light of the potential behavior of others.
The question, rather, is what institutional
commitments and conceptions shape and
constrain judges' preferences and goals as
they interact with colleagues to construct
decisions of the Court.
In particular, as noted in Supreme Court
Decision-Making (Howard Gillman and
Cornell W Clayton, eds., 1999),
"[Blargaining among the justices is not
merely a function of preferences plus an
awareness of interactive effects; it is also an
activity that is constituted by an evolving
set of normative institutional perspectives.
Because of these sorts of institutional effects
the justices internalize an understanding of
whether such behavior is to be considered
professional, as well as an understanding of
what forms of bargaining are acceptable. . . ."
One apparent "rule of the game" of
collegal judgng is that, while certain fonns
of output-focused strategc behavior are
accepted (even encouraged) and others are
quietly tolerated, explicit vote trading is
disallowed. In theory, this observable but
unwritten code of conduct might reflect a
widespread judgment that, in the long
term, vote trading is a counterproductive
strategy for goal-oriented judges on collegal
courts. My strong sense, however, is that
judges (and scholars) believe vote trading is
wrong, not just unwise. But why?
My conclusion here is that the answer is
more complicated than initial intuitions
might suggest. While vote trading and other
strategc maneuvers can plausibly be viewed
as furthering legitimate judicial objectives,
I have sketched a number of objections
suggesting that vote trading nevertheless
constitutes improper judicial behavior. But
different objections rest on very distinct
foundational assumptions about the nature
and purpose of collegal adjudication.
Moreover, some (though not all) objections
logcally entail that certain accepted
strategc practices should be equally
disapproved as well. Finally, some
objections apply to vote trading or other
maneuvers only in some contexts but not
others, nuances not reflected in current
practice. My hope is that this inquiry will
stimulate deeper reflection about the
"paradox" of collegal adjudication, and
perhaps assist judges in developing a more
refined understanding of the norms of their
profession.
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